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Neboj§a Nakicenovic 
Freeing Energy from Carbon 
T HE DOING OF MORE WITH LESS attests to the practical ad-vancement of societies. In fact, labor, capital, and inputs of other factors to the economy have demonstrably de-
creased per unit of output and value added since the beginnings of 
the industrial revolution some two hundred years ago. These in-
creases in the productivity of resources owe to numerous technical 
and organizational innovations and to an enormous accumulation 
of knowledge and experience. 
A portion of the increases in productivity is attributable simply 
to the increasing scale of activities, also made possible by technical 
and organizational innovations. Often with greater size, cost de-
creases and efficiency increases within specific frames. For ex-
ample, in building electricity-generating plants a long-standing 
rule of thumb was that the cost of the plant would grow with two-
thirds the power of its size. We are uncertain now where we stand 
with respect to optimal scale of many facilities and systems, but it 
seems likely that considerable opportunities to lift efficiency re-
main. 
Perhaps more important than simply size and more certain to 
continue yielding productivity gains is the accumulation of knowl-
edge and experience. Growth in output in an economic system 
with suitable incentives tends to bring positive returns of its own. 
This process is sometimes referred to as "learning by doing." 
Analysis of learning curves in a range of industries, beginning with 
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the manufacture of aircraft, has provided ample evidence that the 
costs per unit of output decrease rapidly at a rate proportional to 
the doubling of the output. 1 
Energy . industries and energy systems are not exceptional. This 
essay will demonstrate that large secular decreases in energy re-
quirements per unit of economic output have been achieved through-
out the world, as we have learned better how to make, operate, 
and use energy systems. Furthermore, the emissions of carbon 
dioxide from energy systems, coming from the combustion of the 
carbon molecules that wood, coal, oil, and gas all contain, have 
also decreased per unit of energy consumed. This decarbonization 
of the energy system proves to be emblematic of its entire evolu-
tion. 
At the same time, because of population and general economic 
growth, absolute world consumption of energy (and many other 
resources) has increased, especially in the more industrialized coun-
tries. This absolute growth often dominates environmental news 
and views. Rising carbon dioxide emissions are the main contribu-
tor to fears of global climatic change. This and other environmen-
tal concerns associated with carbon makes energy free from car-
bon a highly desirable goal for the energy system. The fact that 
energy and most of the other factor inputs have decreased per unit 
of output over long periods of time provides a fresh basis on which 
to project the range of possible future resource use and emissions. 
A glance at the changes in labor and materials requirements 
helps to establish the context and the pervasiveness of the phe-
nomenon that we will observe most closely in energy. Since 1860, 
the number of hours that workers in the industrialized countries 
are engaged in paid work each year has generally decreased by half 
(Figure 1 ). Though the Japanese bucked the trend for several 
decades around mid-century and continue to work more than their 
European and American counterparts, they too are working less. 
Taking into account the dramatic increase in individual income 
and consumption over the period, we know that the labor require-
ments per unit of income and output decreased much faster than 
the number of hours worked. Furthermore, because life expec-
tancy increased by several decades during this period, the years of 
paid work required to sustain lifelong consumption for a worker 
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Figure 1. Annual Working Hours in Five Industrialized Countries from 
1860 to 1990, expressed in total working hours per year. 
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Note: Hours spent on sick leave, strikes, and holidays are subtracted from the formal 
working time. 
Sources: Angus Maddison, Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development: A Long-Run 
Comparative View (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991 ); and Jesse H. Ausubel and 
Arnulf Gri.ibler, "Working Less and Living Longer: Long-Term Trends in Working Time 
and Time Budgets," Technological Forecasting and Social Change 50 (1995) : 113-131. 
at prevailing levels decreased from about three-quarters of a life-
time to less than one-half.2 
Decreases in requirements for many materials are similarly dra-
matic.3 For example, in the United States, which is quite represen-
tative of industrialized countries in this regard, steel use declined 
from about 70 kilograms per $1,000 of GNP (in 1983 dollars) in 
1920 to about one-third that level in recent years; cement per GNP 
in the United States has dropped by about half since 1960.4 How-
ever, this dematerialization of the economy is varied. In some 
cases, a lighter steel beam does the work of an earlier, heavier one. 
In other cases, new materials replace the steel. In contrast, demand 
per GNP has grown steeply since mid-century for certain petro-
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chemicals (such as ethylene) and for advanced composite materi-
als. Requirements for paper per GNP have been rather flat since 
about 1930. 
Analysis "of energy materials and decarbonization may in prac-
tice shed light on the question of dematerialization. Because en-
ergy is one of the most important factor inputs and is embedded in 
most materials, products, and services, decreases in specific energy 
requirements can also decrease the intensity of materials use. The 
carbon content of energy and the subsequent carbon dioxide emis-
sions form the largest single mass flow associated with human 
activities, excepting water. Current annual global carbon emis-
sions are about 6 billion tons, or more than 1,000 kilograms per 
person on the planet. In comparison, the global steel industry 
annually produces about 700 million tons, or about 120 kilograms 
per person. Therefore, decarbonization can contribute in a large 
way to dematerialization. 
Let us now turn to energy and examine the savings of carbon 
that have been obtained, why they may have occurred, and whether 
future savings may be sufficient to spare the environment some 
unwanted heat. -
THE GLOBAL HISTORY OF ENERGY AND CARBON SA VIN GS 
To form a picture of carbon use, we need to be able to sum and 
compare its appearances. One way is to index carbon by the ratio 
of carbon atoms to hydrogen atoms in the energy sources that 
contain both of these fuels. Fuelwood has the highest effective 
carbon content, with about ten carbon atoms per hydrogen atom. 
If consumed without a compensating growth of biomass, which 
occurred in the past and still occurs in most developing countries, 
fuelwood thus produces higher carbon emissions than any of the 
fossil energy forms. Among fossil energy sources, coal has the 
highest carbon-to-hydrogen ratio, roughly one to one. Oil has on 
average one carbon for every two hydrogen atoms, and natural 
gas, or methane, has a ratio of one to four. Using these types of 
elemental analyses, we can estimate the total amount of carbon 
contained in a given supply of an individual fuel or a mix of fuels 
and compare this amount to energy consumed or associated eco-
nomic output. 
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Decarbonization can then be expressed as a product of two 
factors: 1) carbon emissions per unit of energy consumption; and 
2) energy requirements per unit of value added, which is often 
called energy intensity. Available data allow us to assess with 
reasonable confidence the trend for each of these factors since the 
nineteenth century for major energy-consuming regions and coun-
tries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and thus 
for the world as a whole as well. As Figure 2 shows, the ratio of 
carbon emissions per unit of primary energy consumed globally 
has fallen by about 0.3 percent per year since 1860. The ratio has 
decreased because high-carbon fuels, such as wood and coal, have 
been continuously replaced by those with lower carbon content, 
such as gas, and also in recent decades by nuclear energy from 
uranium and hydropower, which contain no carbon. 
The historical rate of decrease in energy intensity per unit of 
value appears to have averaged about 1 percent per year since the 
mid-nineteenth century and about 2 percent per year in some 
countries since the 1970s. The overall tendency is toward lower 
Figure 2. Carbon Intensity of Global Energy Consumption, expressed in 
tons of carbon per ton of oil equivalent energy (tC/toe). 
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energy intensities, although paths of energy development in differ-
ent countries have varied enormously and rather consistently over 
long periods (Figure 3). For example, France and Japan have 
always used energy more sparingly than the United States, the 
United Kingdom, or Germany. In some of the rapidly industrializ-
ing countries, such as China or Nigeria, commercial energy inten-
sity is still increasing. Because commercial energy replaces tradi-
tional energy forms not sold in the markets whose transactions 
find their way into national statistical data, total energy intensity 
may diminish while commercial energy intensity increases. The 
present energy intensity of Thailand resembles the situation in the 
United States in the late 1940s. The energy intensity of India and 
its present improvement rates are similar to those of the United 
States about a century ago. 
Figure 3. Primary Energy Intensity, including biomass, per unit of value 
added from 1855 to 1990, expressed in kilogram of oil equivalent 
energy per constant GDP in 1990 US dollars (kgoe/US$1990). 
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Combining the two factors of carbon intensity and energy inten-
sity (Figure 4) reveals the large differences in the policies and 
structures of energy systems among countries. For example, though 
Japan and France have both achieved high degrees of 
decarbonization, they have followed disparate routes. At the glo-
bal level, the long-term overall reduction in carbon intensity per 
unit of value from both factors totals about 1.3 percent per year 
since the mid-1800s. 
The major determinants of energy-related carbon emissions can 
be represented as multiplicative factors in a simple equation. Plac-
ing carbon emissions on one side, on the other we have population 
growth, per capita value added, energy consumption per unit of 
Figure 4. Global Decarbonization by Carbon and Energy Sparing from 
1870 to 1988, expressed in kilograms of carbon per kilogram of oil 
equivalent energy (kgC/kgoe) and in kilograms of oil equivalent energy 
per $1,000 of GDP in constant 1985 dollars. 
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value added, and carbon emissions per unit of energy consumed.5 
As we have seen, the last two terms in this equation are decreasing 
globally. However, their decline is counteracted by rising values 
for the preceding terms, population and economic activity, result-
ing in an overall global increase in energy consumption and car-
bon emissions. 
The world's global population is currently increasing at a rate of 
about 1.6 percent per year. The longer-term population growth 
rate since 1800 has been about 1 percent per year. Most popula-
tion experts predict at least another doubling during the next 
century.6 Economic activity has been increasing in excess of global 
population growth since the beginning of industrialization, inade 
possible by the productivity increases referred to at the outset of 
this essay. In recent decades global economic growth, stirred by 
both population and productivity gains, has proceeded at about 3 
percent per year. Subtracting 1.3 percent for decarbonization, the 
result is that global carbon emissions have been increasing at 
about 1.7 percent per year. A continuation would imply a dou-
bling of emissions in about forty years. Fearing such an increase, 
we must examine in detail the differing paths to decarbonization 
to see what the limits of the process might be. 
DECONSTRUCTING DECARBONIZATION 
An examination of five countries-China, France, India, Japan, 
and the United States-furthers our understanding of the 
decarbonization process.7 These countries represent diverse eco-
nomic and energy systems and life-styles as well as a significant 
share of the world's energy use. The United States has one of the 
highest energy intensities of all the industrialized countries, and 
the highest per capita energy consumption in the world. France 
and Japan have among the lowest energy intensities in the world, 
but for different reasons, as we shall discuss. China and India are 
rapidly developing and still replacing traditional energy sources 
with commercial ones, and thus they exhibit very high energy and 
carbori intensities. Together, the five countries account for about 
45 percent of global primary energy consumption and more than 
40 percent of energy-related carbon emissions. 
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To determine more precisely the various causes and determi-
nants of the decreasing carbon intensity of energy, we disaggregate 
the energy system into its three major constituents: primary en-
ergy consumption, energy conversion, and final energy consump-
tion. Primary energy consumption embraces the requirement for 
original resources such as coal, crude oil, and uranium. Final 
energy refers to the gasoline pumped into a car's fuel tank, the 
electricity for powering a room air conditioner, or firewood if used 
directly for cooking or heating. Primary energy, such as coal, is 
rarely consumed in its original form in a household or office but 
rather is converted into electricity, fuel, and heat. Thus, final 
energy, which is consumed directly, in some sense represents best 
the actual energy requirements of the economy and individual 
consumers. 
In fact, neither primary energy consumption nor conversion is 
transparent to consumers. For example, the production process for 
electricity is invisible to most consumers. Because electricity itself 
is carbon-free, it does not emit carbon (or soot, sulfur dioxide, and 
other pollutants) at the point of consumption. However, carbon 
can be emitted in converting primary energy forms into electricity. 
To a lesser degree this is also true of other forms of final energy, 
such as oil products. Although the carbon emissions per liter of 
diesel or gasoline finally used in a truck are basically the same 
throughout the world, the carbon emissions produced in convert-
ing different grades of crude oil into the two products can vary 
substantially. 
To deconstruct the constituent decarbonization rates of the en-
ergy system, we make three assumptions. First, the carbon inten-
sity of primary energy is defined as the ratio of the total carbon 
content of primary fuels to total primary energy consumption for 
a given country. Second, the carbon intensity of final energy is 
defined as the carbon content of all forms of final energy divided 
by the total final energy consumption. The third assumption is 
that the carbon intensity of energy conversion is the difference 
between the two intensities just described. So, for example, the 
carbon intensity of primary energy runs high when wood and coal 
supply most of the fuel. The carbon intensity of conversion runs 
high when coal burns to make most of the electricity and when the 
conversion (or transmission and distribution) system itself is wasteful. 
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Efficiency improvements in the energy system mean that less pri-
mary energy is consumed per unit of final energy; lower conver-
sion losses '. therefore result in lower carbon emissions. The carbon 
intensity of consumption runs high when the final consumer cooks 
with coal or travels by gasoline and when end-use devices are 
inefficient. 
Let us now compare the carbon intensities of final, primary, and 
conversion energy for the United States, Japan, France, China, and 
India in recent decades (Figures 5 through 7). Steady reductions in 
the carbon intensity of final energy in all five countries stand out 
above all. On average, the three industrialized countries have 
spared about 20 percent since 1960, while the pair of developing 
countries have cut back about 15 percent since the early 1970s. 
The reductions converge tightly in the three industrialized coun-
tries. The gap between the developed and the developing countries 
is also slowly narrowing because of the slightly more rapid de-
clines in intensity in the latter. 
Figure 5. Carbon Intensities of Final Energy, expressed in tons of 
carbon per ton of oil equivalent energy (tC/toe). 
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Figure 6. Carbon Intensities of Primary Energy, expressed in tons of 
carbon per ton of oil equivalent energy (tC/toe). 
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Figure 7. Carbon Intensities of Energy Conversion, expressed in tons of 
carbon per ton of oil equivalent energy (tC/toe). 
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The major reason for the decarbonization of final energy is the 
increasing share of electricity in final energy throughout the world. 
The percentage of global primary energy used to create electricity 
has climbed during this century from 5 in the year 1910 to 20 in 
1950 to about 35 in 1990. A second reason is that the average mix 
of other fuels consumed for final energy has a decreasing carbon 
content, that is, greater shares of oil products and natural gas. 
Accordingly, these products also have a higher hydrogen content, 
a point that will be discussed in the final section of this essay. 
The carbon intensity of primary energy has also fallen in all five 
countries, though only very slightly in the United States, where 
coal has retained its strong role. The carbon intensities of conver-
sion give a completely different picture, however. The diversity in 
the development and structure of the ene:-gy systems of the five 
countries becomes apparent. In the developing countries, the car-
bon intensity of conversion has increased, while in France it dropped 
sharply; in the United States and Japan the conversion intensity 
initially rose before declining during the latter part of the period 
analyzed. 
Should China and India continue to rely heavily on coal as their 
primary source of energy, continuing to lessen the carbon intensity 
of primary energy in these countries will prove difficult. In fact, 
sometime in the next century the downward trend in the carbon 
intensity of primary energy could reverse itself, caused by an even 
higher share of electricity in end use but generated with coal. 
Alternatively, China and India could restructure their energy sys-
tems to make increasing use of natural gas or nuclear energy and 
other zero-carbon options. Such shifts would align their energy 
systems with those of the more industrialized countries. 
Focusing on the United States and Japan, we see that the carbon 
intensity of primary energy exceeds that of final energy, with 
conversion intensity the highest of the three. While final carbon 
intensity decreases somewhat faster in Japan (about 0.8 percent 
per year) than the United States (about 0.5 percent per year), the 
difference in the conversion intensities is much more dramatic. In 
both countries the changes in the carbon intensity of energy con-
version are erratic, especially compared to the steady improve-
ments in final intensities. The overall reduction of carbon intensity 
in Japan stems primarily from improvements in energy efficiency 
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and, to a lesser degree, from the replacement of carbon-intensive 
energy forms. 
France provides a contrast. Here, the rapid introduction of 
nuclear energy since the mid-1970s has led to higher rates of 
decarbonization of primary energy and of conversion (because an 
increasing share of electricity is produced without carbon emis-
sions) than of final energy. This strategy to achieve low carbon 
emissions is completely internal to the energy system and funda-
mentally decoupled from the consumer. Nevertheless, the rela-
tively smooth improvement in final carbon intensity is similar to 
that observed in Japan and the United States. 
China and India present a different picture, though they re-
semble one another. The three energy ratios and their evolution 
are similar in these countries despite their many social and cultural 
differences, as well as those differences that may be attributed to 
the varying development paths of planned and market economies. 
In both countries, the carbon intensity of primary energy is dimin-
ishing slightly. The carbon intensity of final energy, on the other 
hand, decreases at rates comparable to those observed in industri-
alized countries. In India, the faster decarbonization of final en-
ergy is due to the replacement of traditional fuels by commercial 
energy forms. For example, the use of biomass (mainly wood that 
is not replaced by a new forest) is more carbon intensive than 
using either kerosene or bottled gas. The difference in carbon 
intensity between electric lighting (especially if efficient light bulbs 
are used) and traditional illumination is even more pronounced. In 
any case, the developing economies are undergoing basically the 
same process of decarbonizing final energy use as the most devel-
oped countries. 
In the industrialized countries, the decarbonization of final en-
ergy consumption has been accompanied by additional structural 
changes in the energy system. These led to improvements in 
decarbonization in the energy system itself, as demonstrated by the 
downward trends in the carbon intensity of conversion. In con-
trast, China and India have not undergone this transition. Their 
energy systems depend heavily on coal, whereas most industrial-
ized countries have in large measure replaced coal with less car-
bon-intensive sources, even in electricity production. As a conse-
quence of their dependence on coal, both China and India show 
\ 
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rapid increases in the carbon intensity of conversion. Should a 
transition to a lower carbon intensity in developing countries not 
occur in the coming decades, the likely reductions in carbon emis-
sions in the industrialized countries will be offset, hampering ef-
forts to halt the global increase in carbon emissions. 
In sum, determining decarbonization only as the ratio of total 
carbon emissions per unit of primary energy consumption may veil 
the interaction between the energy system and the economy. As 
the structure of an energy system changes, so does the carbon 
intensity of its three constituent parts. The actual forms of final 
energy demanded and consumed matter greatly in the logic of 
decarbonization. Because electricity and heat contain no carbon, 
the carbon intensity of final energy is generally lower than the 
carbon intensity of primary energy. In addition, its rate of decrease 
exceeds that of primary energy because of the increasing share of 
electricity and other fuels with lower carbon content, such as 
natural gas, in the final energy mix. At the level of final energy, 
decarbonization is a durable, pervasive phenomenon. The likely 
explanation is a congruence in consumer behavior and preferences 
as expressed in the structure of final energy over a wide range of 
income and developmental levels. 
THE ELEMENT AL EVOLUTION 
We have seen the increasing needs for electricity and hydrogen-
rich forms of final energy. Can these be reconciled with the rela-
tively slow and often opposing changes in the structure of energy 
systems and the primary energy supply? The historical replace-
ment of coal by oil, and later by natural gas, at the global level 
shows the way. The well-documented evolutionary substitution of 
sources of primary energy suggests that natural gas and later 
carbon-free energy forms will become the leading sources of pri-
mary energy globally during the next century.8 
The competitive struggle between the five main sources of pri-
mary energy-wood, coal, oil, gas, and nuclear-has proven to be 
a dynamic and regular process that can be described by relatively 
simple rules. A glance reveals the dominance of coal as the major 
energy source between the 1880s and the 1960s after a long period 
during which fuelwood and other traditional energy sources led 
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(Figure 8). The mature coal economy meshed with the massive 
expansion of railroads and steamship lines, the growth of steel-
making, and the electrification of factories. During the 1960s, oil 
assumed a dominant role in conjunction with the development of 
automotive transport, the petrochemical industry, and markets for 
home heating oil. 
The model of energy substitution projects natural gas (methane) 
to be the dominant source of energy during the first decades of the 
next century, although oil should maintain the second largest 
share until the 2020s. Such an exploratory look requires addi-
tional assumptions to describe the later competition of potential 
new energy sources such as nuclear, solar, and other renewables 
that have not yet captured sufficient market shares to allow reli-
Figure 8. Global Primary Energy Substitution from 1860 to 1982 and 
Projections for the Future, expressed in fractional market shares (F). 
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able estimation of their penetration rates. In Figure 8 it is assumed 
that nuclear energy will diffuse at rates comparable to those at 
which oil aI)d natural gas diffused half a century earlier. Such a 
scenario would require a new generation of nuclear installations; 
today such prospects are at best questionable. This leaves natural 
gas with the largest share of primary energy for at least the next 
fifty years. In the past, new sources of energy have emerged from 
time to time, coinciding with the saturation and subsequent de-
cline of the dominant competitor. In Figure 8, "Solfus" represents 
a major carbon-free energy technology, such as solar or fusion, 
that could emerge during the 2020s at the time when natural gas 
is expected to reach the limits of its market niche. 
The unfolding of primary energy substitution implies a gradual 
continuation of energy decarbonization globally. Figure 9 shows 
how the ratio of hydrogen to carbon atoms in the world fuel mix 
has changed as a result of primary energy substitution. If natural 
gas becomes the dominant source of energy, this ratio can be 
expected to approach the level of four hydrogen atoms to one 
carbon. Improvements beyond this level would have to be achieved 
by the introduction of noncarbon energy sources and by the sus-
tainable use of biomass. 
A methane economy offers a bridge to the noncarbon energy 
future consistent with both the dynamics of primary energy substi-
tution and the steadily decreasing carbon intensity of final energy. 
As nonfossil energy sources are introduced into the primary energy 
mix, new energy conversion systems would be required to provide 
zero-carbon carriers of energy in addition to electricity. The ideal 
candidate is pure hydrogen, used as a gas or liquid. Hydrogen and 
electricity could carry virtually pollution-free and environmentally 
benign energy to end users in a carbon-free energy system. 
To the extent that both hydrogen and electricity might be pro-
duced from methane, the carbon separated as a by-product could 
be contained and stored, probably in underground caverns. As the 
methane contribution to the global energy supply reaches its limit 
and subsequently declines, . carbon-free sources of energy would 
take over, eliminating the need for carbon handling and storage. 
This would conclude the global trend toward decarbonization and 
the resulting major transformation of the industrial ecosystem. 
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Figure 9. Ratio of Hydrogen (H) to Carbon (C) for Global Primary 
Energy Consumption since 1860 and Projections for the Future, 
expressed as a ratio of Hydrogen to Carbon (H/C). 
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Sources: Cesare Marchetti, "Nuclear Plants and Nuclear Niches," Nuclear Science and 
Engineering 90 (1985) : 521-526; and Jesse H. Ausubel, "Can Technology Spare the 
Earth ?," American Scientist 84 (2) ( 1996): 166-178. 
The emergent system could accommodate cleanly the foreseeable 
levels of population and economic activity. 
In fact, an energy system of the distant future that relies on 
electricity and hydrogen as the complementary energy carriers 
would also advance dematerialization. Hydrogen has the lowest 
mass of all atoms, and its use would radically reduce the total mass 
flow associated with energy activities and the resulting emissions. 
Electricity is free of material emissions, and the only product of 
appropriate hydrogen combustion is water. Thus, decarbonization 
not only contributes to dematerialization but is also consistent 
with the emergence of new technologies that hold the promise of 
high flexibility, productivity, and environmental compatibility. 
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Weighty carbon is a poor match for the evolving final energy 
demands of modern societies. Fortunately, decarbonization has 
asserted itself already as a widespread, long-term development 
driven by deepening, strengthening forces. 
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